Deconstruction/ Krapp’s Last Tape

General overview The auther of this essay is interested in aiming the essence of ridiculousness, Beckett is master of absurd theater, and Krapps ut to the highest degree(prenominal) taping is matchless of the near influencial interprets in absured theater which is deconstructed by nature. Not just the cipher and auther further the approach itself help the auther of this essay to find the true substance of absurdity which itself leads kind, by and by passing a chaos, to out-and-out(a) peace. In the noticeing paragraphs, premier there is a biography of Samual Beckett the auther of Krapps last immortalise.Then the discussion goes by dint of deconstruction which is non inciteu each(prenominal)y an approach plainly a training stategy and short break is devoted to introsucing La fundaments eccentric of human psyche. by and by the application of deconstruction and slightly other points on Krapps last tape is placed. At the end there is a conclusion of e unfei gned what the auther of this essay trying to say. A Biography of Samual Beckett Samuel Barclay Beckett (April 13, 1906 December 22, 1989) was an Irish forefront and absurdist presentwright, novelist, poet and theatre director.His typographys, both(prenominal) in English and French, provide bleak, and darkly comedic, ruminations on the human condition. He is simultaneously considered as ace of the last new(a)ists and peerless and only(a) of the graduation exercise postmodernists. He was a main writer in what the tyro, Martin Esslin, enclosureed the flying field of the Absurd. The submit areas associated with this impulsion sh be the belief that human compriseence has uncomplete supposeing nor purpose, and ultimately communication breaks d confess, often in a caustic comedy manner.Beckett studied French, Italian and English at Trinity College capital of Ireland from 1923-1927, whereupon graduating he took up a teaching post in Paris. temporary hookup in Paris, he met the Irish novelist James Joyce, who became an inspiration and mentor to the girlish Beckett. He published his commencement ceremony work, a critical essay endorsing Joyces work entitled DanteB be giveno. VicoJoyce in 1929. Th harshout the 1930s he proceed to write and publish m both essays and reviews, steadytu exclusivelyy beginning work on novels.During World War II, Beckett joined the French Resistance as a courier after the Germans began their occupation in 1940. Becketts unit was betrayed in August of 1942, and he and Suzanne fled on foot to the sm exclusively village of Roussillon in the south of France. They continued to aid the Resistance by storing arms in his backyard. He was awarded both the Croix de Guerre and Medaille de la Resistance by the French regimen for his wartime efforts. Beckett was reticent to speak about this era of his life.Beckett continued writing novels by means ofout the 1940s, and had the first part of his story The End published in Jean-Pau l Sartres magazine Les Temps Modernes, the bite part of which was neer published in the magazine. Beckett began writing his most famous simulated military operation, Waiting for Godot, in October 1948 and completed it in January 1949. He origin wholly(prenominal)y wrote this piece, like most of his subsequent works, in French first and then translated it to English. It was published in 1952 and premiered in 1953, garnering positive and controversial reactions in Paris.The English recitation did non appear until two years later, first premiered in London in 1955 to mixed reviews and had a successful run in New York City after being a sibilation in Miami. The critical and commercial success of Waiting for Godot opened the brink to a formwriting carg matchlessr for Beckett. He wrote m some(prenominal) other well up-k instantlyn plays, including endgame (1957), Krapps brook Tape (1958, and surprisingly create verbally in English), dexterous Days (1961, also in English) and Play (1963). He was awarded the 1961 International Publishers Formentor jimmy along with Jorge Luis Borges.In that like year, Beckett married Suzanne Dechevaux-Dumesnil in a civil ceremony, though the two had been together since 1938. He also began a relativeship with BBC hired hand editor Barbara Bray, which lasted, concurrently to his marriage to Suzanne, until his death, in 1989. Beckett is regarded as angiotensin converting enzyme of the most influential writers of the twentieth century. He was awarded the 1969 Nobel Prize in Literature. He died on December 22, 1989, of complications from emphysema and possibly Parkinsons disease five months after his wife, Suzanne.The two argon interred together in Montparnasse Cemetery in Paris. (1) Methodology and Approach deconstructionism, as applied in the criticism of books, designates a hypothesis and practice of reading which enquirys and claims to subvert or undermine the assertion that the carcass of speech communication pro vides flat coats that atomic number 18 adequate to establish the boundaries, the coherence or unity, and the determinatemeanings of a literary text. Typically, a deconstructive reading involvesout to try out that conflicting forces inwardly the text itself coiffure to dissipate the be definiteness of its tructure and meanings into an vague array ofincompatible and undecidable possibilities. The condition and namer of deconstruction is the French thinker Jacques Derrida, among whose precursors were Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) andMartin Heidegger (1889- 1976)German philosophers who put to radical question fundamental philosophical concepts ofttimes(prenominal) as k straight offledge, truth, and identityas well as Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), whose psychoanalysis violated traditional concepts of a coherent exclusive consciousness and a unitary self.Derrida constituteed his basic views in trine books, all published in 1967, entitled Of Grammatology, Writing and rest, and Speech and Phenomena since then he has reiterated, expanded, and applied those views in a rapid sequence of publications. Derridas belles-lettres are multifactorial and elusive, and the summary here washstand only read some of their main tendencies.His point of vantage is what, in Of Grammatology, he calls the axial marriage proposal that there is no outside-thetext (il ny a rien hors du texte, or alternatively il ny a pas de hors-texte). Like all Derridas key impairment and statements, this has multiple significations, save a primary one is that a reader crowd out non get beyond verbal signs to any things-in-themselves which, because they are independent of the musical arrangement of spoken speech communication, might serve to anchor a determinable meaning.Derridas reiterated claim is that not only all horse opera philosophies and theories of quarrel, nevertheless all Western uses of language, hence all Western culture, are logocentric that is, they are centered or footinged on a intelligence (which in Greek sensory faculty both word and rationality) or, as stated in a phrase he adopts from Heidegger, they rely on the metaphysics of presence. They are logocentric, accord to Derrida, in part because they are phonocentric that is, they grant, implicitly or explicitly, logical priority, or privilege, to speech over writing as the model for analyzing all discourse.By logos, or presence, Derrida signifies what he also calls an ultimate referenta self-certifying and self-sufficient ground, or foundation, for sale to us totally outside the play of language itself, that is directly present to our awareness and serves to center (that is, to anchor, organize, and guarantee) the twist of the lingual system, and as a topic suffices to fix the bounds, coherence, and determinate meanings of any mouth or written utterance indoors that system. (On Derridas decentering of structuralism, see poststructuralism. Historical instances of claimed foundati ons for language are God as the guarantor of its validity, or a Platonic form of the true reference of a general term, or a Hegelian telos or goal toward which all process strives, or an mark to signify something determinate that is directly present to the awareness of the person who initiates an utterance. Derrida undertakes to show that these and all other attempts by Western philosophy to establish an absolute ground in presence, and all implicit reliance on much(prenominal)(prenominal) a ground in using language, are bound to fail.Especially, he directs his skeptical ex coiffure against the phonocentric assumptionwhich he regards as central in Western theories of language that at the instant of speaking, the intention of a vocalizer to mean something determinate by an utterance is immediately and liberaly present in the speakers consciousness, and is also communicable to an auditor. (See intention, under interpretation and hermeneutics. ) In Derridas view, we must(prenomin al) al styluss say to a greater extent, and other, than we intend to say.Derrida expresses his alternative conception that the play of linguistic meanings is undecidable in terms derived from Saussures view that in a signsystem, both the signifiers (the signifi idlert elements of a language, whether spoken or written) and the signifieds (their conceptual meanings) owe their seeming identities, not to their own positive or inherent features, besides to their contrarietys from other speech-sounds, written marks, or conceptual significations. See Saussure, in linguistics in modern criticism and in semiotics. ) From this view Derrida evolves his radical claim that the features that, in any grumpy utterance, would serve to establish the signified meaning of a word, are never present to us in their own positive identity, since both these features and their significations are nothing other than a network of differences.On the other hand, neither can these identifying features be tell to be strictly absent instead, in any spoken or written utterance, the seeming meaning is the aftermath only of a self-effacing traceself-effacing in that one is not aware of it which consists of all the nonpresent differences from other elements in the language system that invest the utterance with its effect of having a meaning in its own right. The consequence, in Derridas view, is that we can never, in any instance of speech or writing, return a demonstrably fixed and decidable present meaning.He says that the differential play (jeu) of language may produce the cause of decidable meanings in an utterance or text, but asserts that these are nevertheless effects and miss a ground that would justify certainty in interpretation. In a characteristic move, Derrida coins the blending term differance, in which, he says, he uses the spelling -ance instead of -enee to indicate a fusion of two interpretings of the French verb differer to be different, and to defer.This double intel lect points to the phenomenon that, on the one hand, a text proffers the effect of having a consequence that is the product of its difference, but that on the other hand, since this proffered significance can never come to rest in an actual presenceor in a language-independent rejectiveity Derrida calls a transcendental signifiedits determinate precondition is deferred from one linguistic interpretation to another in a movement or play,as Derrida puts it, en abimethat is, in an endless regress.To Derridas view,then, it is difference that admits achievable the meaning whose possibility (as adecidable meaning) it necessarily baffles. As Derrida says in another of his coinages, the meaning of any spoken or written utterance, by the action of argue immanent linguistic forces, is ineluctably disseminateda term which includes, among its deliberately confounding significations, that of having an effect of meaning (a semantic effect), of dispersing meanings among innumerable altern atives, and of negating any specific meaning. on that point is and then no ground, in the incessant play of difference that constitutes any language, for attributing a decidable meaning, or make up a finite set of determinately multiple meanings (which he calls polysemism), to any utterance that we speak or write. (What Derrida calls polysemism is what William Empson called ambiguity see ambiguity. As Derrida puts it in Writing and Difference The absence of a transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely (p. 280) Several of Derridas skeptical performances go been especially influentialin deconstructive literary criticism. One is to subvert the innumerable binary oppositionssuch as speech/writing, nature/culture, truth/error, male/female which are essential structural elements in logocentric language.Derrida shows that such oppositions constitute a implicit hierarchy, in which the first term dish ups as privileged and superior and the seco nd term as derivative and inferior. Derridas procedure is to invert the hierarchy, by covering that the secondary term can be made out to be derivative from, or a special case of, the primary term but instead of stopping at this reversal, he goes on to change both hierarchies, leaving them in a condition of undecidability. Among deconstructive literary critics, one such demonstration is to take the standard hierarchical opposition of lit/criticism, to invert it so as to make criticism primary and literary works secondary, and then to represent, as an undecidable set of oppositions, the assertions that criticism is a species of literature and that literature is a species of criticism. A second public presentation influential in literary criticism is Derridas deconstruction of any attempt to establish a unwaveringly determinate bound, or limit, or margin, to a textual work so as to differentiate what is inside from what is outside the work. A third operation is his analysis of the inherent nonlogicality, or rhetoricitythat is, the inescapable reliance on rhetorical figures and figurative languagein all uses of language, including in what philosophers be in possession of traditionally claimed to be the strictly existent and logical arguments of philosophy.Derrida, for example, emphasizes the indispensable reliance in all modes of discourse on metaphors that are assumed to be merely convenient substitutes for literal, or proper meanings then he undertakes to show, on the one hand, that metaphors cannot be cut to literal meanings but, on the other hand, that supposedly literal terms are themselves metaphors whose metaphoric nature has been forgotten.Derridas characteristic way of execution is not to lay out his deconstructive concepts and operations in a positive exposition, but to allow them to emerge in a sequence of warning(a) termination readings of passages from writings that range from Plato through Jean-Jacques Rousseau to the present erawritings that, by standard classification, are mainly philosophical, although occasionally literary. He describes his procedure as a double reading. Initially, that is, he interprets a text as, in the standard fashion, lisible (readable or intelligible), since it engenders effects of having eterminate meanings. But this reading, Derrida says, is only provisional, as a stand for toward a second, or deconstructive critical reading, which disseminates the provisional meaning into an indefinite range of significations that, he claims, always involve (in a term interpreted from logic) an aporiaan insuperable deadlock, or double bind, of incompatible or contradictory meanings which are undecidable, in that we wishing any sufficient ground for choosing among them.The result, in Derridas rendering, is that each text deconstructs itself, by undermining its own supposed grounds and dispersing itself into incoherent meanings in a way, he claims, that the deconstructive reader neither initiates nor produces deconstruction is something that simply happens in a critical reading. Derrida asserts, furthermore, that he has no option except toattempt to slide by his deconstructive readings in the prevailing logocentric language, hence that his own interpretive texts deconstruct themselves in the very act of deconstructing the texts to which they are applied.He insists, however, that deconstruction has nothing to do with destruction, and that all the standard uses of language will inevitably go on what he undertakes, he says, is merely to situate or reinscribe any text in a system of difference which shows the instability of the effects to which the text owes its seeming intelligibility. Derrida did not propose deconstruction as a mode of literary criticism, but as a way of reading all kinds of texts so as to reveal and subvert the tacit metaphysical presuppositions of Western thought.His views and procedures, however, lose been taken up by literary critics, especially in America, who have adapted Derridas critical reading to the kind of close reading of particular literary texts which had earlier been the familiar procedure of the New reproach they do so, however, Paul de Man has said, in a way which reveals that new-critical close readings were not nearly close enough. The end results of the two kinds of close reading are utterly diverse.New exact explications of texts had undertaken to show that a great literary work, in the tight internal similitudes of its figurative and paradoxical meanings, constitutes a freestanding, bounded, and organic fertiliser entity of multiplex yet determinate meanings. On the contrary, a radically deconstructive close reading undertakes to show that a literary text wants a totalized term that makes it an entity, much less an organic unity also that the text, by a play of internal counter-forces, disseminates into an indefinite range of self-conflicting significations.The claim is made by some deconstructive critics that a literary text is superior to nonliterary texts, but only because, by its self-reference, it shows itself to be more aware of features that all texts inescapably share its fictionality, its lack of a genuine ground, and especially its patent rhetoricity, or use of figurative proceduresfeatures that make any right reading or correct reading of a text impossible. Paul de Man was the most innovative and influential of the critics whoapplied deconstruction to the reading of literary texts.In de Mans later writings,he delineated the basic conflicting forces within a text under the headingsof grammar (the autograph or rules of language) and rhetoric (the unruly play of figures and tropes), and aligned these with other foreign forces, such as the constative and pershaping linguistic hold ups that had been distinguished by John capital of Texas (see speech-act theory). In its grammatical aspect, language persistently aspires to determinate, referential, and logically locateed assert ions, which are persistently dispersed by its rhetorical aspect into an open set of non-referential and illogical possibilities.A literary text, then, of inner necessity says one thing and performs another, or as de Man alternatively puts the matter, a text simultaneously asserts and denies the permit of its own rhetorical mode (Allegories of edition, 1979, p. 17). The inevitable result, for a critical reading, is an aporia of woozy possibilities. Barbara Johnson, once a student of de Mans, has applied deconstructive readings not only to literary texts, but to the writings of other critics, includingDerrida himself.Her succinct statement of the aim and methods of a deconstructive reading is often cited deconstruction is not like with destruction The de-construction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out of belligerent forces of signification within the text itself. If anything is destroyed in a deconstructive reading , it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifyingover another. (The Critical Difference, 1980, p. 5) J.Hillis Miller, once the leading American representative of the Geneva School of consciousness-criticism, is now one of the most prominent of deconstructors, known especially for his application of this type of critical reading to prose fiction. Millers statement of his critical practice indicates how drastic the result may be of applying to works of literature the concepts and procedures that Derrida had real for deconstructing the foundations of Western metaphysics Deconstruction as a mode of interpretation works by a careful and circumspect entering of each textual labyrinth.The deconstructive critic seeks to find, by this process of retracing, the element in the system studied which is alogical, the drift in the text in question which will unravel it all, or the loose stone which will pull down the whole building. The deconstruction, rathe r, annihilates the ground on which the building stands by showing that the text has already carry off the ground, knowingly or unknowingly. Deconstruction is not a dismantling of the structure of a text but a demonstration that it has already level itself.Millers conclusion is that any literary text, as a ceaseless play of irreconcilable and contradictory meanings, is indeterminable and undecidable hence, that all reading is necessarily misreading. (St levels argument and Criticism as Cure, II, in Millers possibility Then and Now 1991, p. 126, and Walter Pater A Partial Portrait, Daedalus, Vol. 105, 1976. ) For other aspects of Derridas views see poststructuralism and refer to Geoffrey Bennington, Jacques Derrida (1993).Some of the central books by Jacques Derrida available in English, with the dates of translation into English, are Of Grammatology, translated and introduced by Gayatri C. Spivak, 1976 Writing and Difference (1978) dina distribution (1981). A useful anthology of options from Derrida is A Derrida Reader Between the Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf (1991). Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (1992), is a selection of Derridas discussions of literary texts.An price of admissionible introduction to Derridas views is the edition by Gerald Graff of Derridas noted quarrel with John R. Searle about the speech-act theory of John Austin, entitled Limited Inc. (1988) on this dispute see also Jonathan Culler, Meaning and Iterability, in On Deconstruction (1982). Books exemplifying types of deconstructive literary criticism Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight (1971), and Allegories of Reading (1979) Barbara Johnson, The Critical Difference Essays in the Contemporary grandiloquence of Reading (1980), and A World of Difference (1987) J.Hillis Miller, Fiction and Repetition S dismantle English Novels (1982), The Linguistic Moment From Wordsworth to Stevens (1985), and Theory Then and Now (1991) Cynthia Chase, Decomposing Figures Rhetorical Readings in the Rom antic Tradition (1986). Expositions of Derridas deconstruction and of its applications to literary criticism Geoffrey Hartman, Saving the Text (1981) Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction (1982) Richard Rorty, school of thought as a Kind of Writing, in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982) Michael Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction (1982) typeset C. Taylor, ed. Deconstruction in Context (1986) Christopher Norris, Paul de Man (1988). Among the many critiques of Derrida and of various practitioners of deconstructive literary criticism are Terry Eagleton, The Function of Criticism (1984) M. H. Abrams, The Deconstructive Angel, How to Do Things with Texts, and Construing and Deconstructing, in Doing Things with Texts (1989) John M. Ellis, Against Deconstruction (1989) Wendell V. Harris, ed. , Beyond Poststructuralism (1996). (2) Lacans Model of the human race psyche THE PSYCHE CAN BE DIVIDED into three study structures that control our lives and our cravings.Most of Lacans many terms for t he full complexity of the psyches workings can be related to these three major concepts, which correlate roughly to the three main minute of arcs in the individuals information, as outlined in the Lacan module on psychosexual education 1) The Real. This concept marks the state of nature from which we have been forever severed by our conquer into language. Only as neo-natal children were we close to this state of nature, a state in which there is nothing but need. A baby needs and seeks to satisfy those needs with no sense for any separation among itself and the external creative activity or the field of others.For this reason, Lacan sometimes represents this state of nature as a time of profusion or completeness that is subsequently lost through the entrance into language. The primordial animal need for copulation (for example, when animals are in heat) similarly corresponds to this state of nature. There is a need followed by a search for satisfaction. As utmost as human s are concerned, however, the original is impossible, as Lacan was fond of saying. It is impossible in so far as we cannot express it in language because the very entrance into language marks our irrevocable separation from the concrete.Still, the real continues to exert its order throughout our adult lives since it is the rock against which all our fantasies and linguistic structures ultimately fail. The real for example continues to erupt whenever we are made to point out the physicalness of our existence, an acknowledgement that is usually perceived as traumatic (since it threatens our very globe), although it also drives Lacans sense of jouissance. 2) The Imaginary Order. This concept corresponds to the reverberate stage (see the Lacan module on psychosexual development) and marks the movement of the written report from primeval need to what Lacan terms film. As the connection to the mirror stage suggests, the conceptional is primarily narcissistic even though it sets the stage for the fantasies of lust. (For Lacans learning of desire, see the conterminous module. ) Whereas needs can be fulfilled, demands are, by definition, unsatisfiable in other words, we are already making the movement into the sort of lack that, for Lacan, defines the human subject. Once a child begins to recognize that its body is breach from the world and its mother, it begins to feel anxiety, which is caused by a sense of something lost.The demand of the child, then, is to make the other a part of itself, as it seemed to be in the childs now lost state of nature (the neo-natal months). The childs demand is, therefore, impossible to realize and functions, ultimately, as a reminder of loss and lack. (The difference amidst demand and desire, which is the function of the exemplary order, is simply the acknowledgement of language, truth, and corporation in the latter the demand of the imageal does not proceed beyond a dyadic likeness between the self and the object o ne wants to make a part of oneself. The mirror stage corresponds to this demand in so far as the child misrecognizes in its mirror image a changeless, coherent, whole self, which, however, does not correspond to the real child (and is, therefore, impossible to realize). The image is a fantasy, one that the child sets up in order to compensate for its sense of lack or loss, what Lacan terms an Ideal-I or exemplar ego. That fantasy image of oneself can be filled in by others who we may want to emulate in our adult lives role models, et cetera), anyone that we set up as a mirror for ourselves in what is, ultimately, a narcissistic family. What must be remembered is that for Lacan this fanciful realm continues to exert its influence throughout the life of the adult and is not merely superceded in the childs movement into the symbolic (despite my suggestion of a transparent chronology in the last module).Indeed, the imaginary and the symbolic are, according to Lacan, inextricably i ntertwined and work in tension with the Real. 3) The Symbolic Order (or the big Other). Whereas the imaginary is all about equations and realizations, the symbolic is about language and narrative. Once a child enters into language and accepts the rules and dictates of society, it is able to deal with others. The acceptance of languages rules is aligned with the Oedipus complex, according to Lacan.The symbolic is made possible because of your acceptance of the Name-of-the-Father, those laws and restrictions that control both your desire and the rules of communication It is in the name of the father that we must recognize the suffer of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law (Ecrits 67). Through recognition of the Name-of-the-Father, you are able to enter into a community of others. The symbolic, through language, is the pact which interrelates subjects together in one action.The human action par excellence is orig inally founded on the existence of the world of the symbol, namely on laws and contracts (Freuds Papers 230). Whereas the Real concerns need and the Imaginary concerns demand, the symbolic is all about desire, according to Lacan. (For more on desire, see the next module. ) Once we enter into language, our desire is forever after bound up with the play of language. We should keep in mind, however, that the Real and the Imaginary continue to play a part in the evolution of human desire within the symbolic order.The fact that our fantasies always fail sooner the Real, for example, ensures that we continue to desire desire in the symbolic order could, in fact, be said to be our way to avoid coming into full contact with the Real, so that desire is ultimately most interested not in obtaining the object of desire but, rather, in reproducing itself. The narcissism of the Imaginary is also crucial for the innovation of desire, according to Lacan The primary imaginary relation provides the fundamental framework for all possible erotism. It is a condition to which the object of Eros as such must be distributeted.The object relation must always submit to the narcissistic framework and be inscribed in it (Freuds Papers 174). For Lacan, issue begins here however, to make that honey functionally realisable (to make it move beyond scopophilic narcissism), the subject must reinscribe that narcissistic imaginary relation into the laws and contracts of the symbolic order A creature needs some reference to the beyond of language, to a pact, to a commitment which constitutes him, strictly speaking, as an other, a reference include in the general or, to be more exact, universal system of interhuman symbols.No love can be functionally realisable in the human community, save by means of a specific pact, which, whatever the form it takes, always tends to rifle isolated off into a specific function, at one and the same time within language and outside of it (Freuds Papers 174). The Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic therefrom work together to create the tensions of our psycho impulsive selves. (3) Jacques Lacan has proven to be an important influence on contemporary critical theory, influencing such disparate approaches as feminist movement (through, for example, Judith Butler and Shoshana Felman), film theory (Laura Mulvey, Kaja Silverman, and the various film scholars associated with screen theory), poststructuralism (Cynthia Chase, Juliet Flower MacCannell, and so on ), and Marxism (Louis Althusser, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Zizek, etc. ).Lacan is also exemplary of what we can understand as the postmodern break with Sigmund Freud. Whereas Freud could still be said to work within an empirical, humanist tradition that still believes in a stable selfs ability to access the truth, Lacan is properly post-structuralist, which is to say that Lacan questions any simple notion of either self or truth, exploring instead how kno wledge is constructed by way of linguistic and ideological structures that organize not only our conscious but also our unconscious lives.Whereas Freud continued to be tempted by organic models and with a desire to find the neurological and, thus, natural causes for sexual development, Lacan offered a more properly linguistic model for understanding the human subjects entrance into the kind order. The emphasis was thus less on the bodily causes of behavior (cathexis, libido, instinct, etc. ) than it was on the ideological structures that, especially through language, make the human subject come to understand his or her relationship to himself and to others.Indeed, according to Lacan, the entrance into language necessarily entails a radical break from any sense of worldlyity in and of itself. According to Lacan, one must always distinguish between mankind (the fantasy world we convince ourselves is the world around us) and the real (a materiality of existence beyond language a nd thus beyond expressibility). The development of the subject, in other words, is made possible by an endless misrecognition of the real because of our need to construct our sense of reality in and through language.So much are we reliant on our linguistic and social version of reality that the eruption of pure materiality (of the real) into our lives is radically disruptive. And yet, the real is the rock against which all of our artificial linguistic and social structures necessarily fail. It is this tension between the real and our social laws, meanings, conventions, desires, etc. that determines our psychosexual lives. Not even our unconscious escapes the effects of language, which is why Lacan argues th t the unconscious is structured like a language (Four Fundamental 203). Lacans version of psychosexual development is, therefore, organized around the subjects ability to recognize, first, iconic signs and, then, eventually, language. This entrance into language follows a particu lar developmental model, according to Lacan, one that is quite distinct from Freuds version of the same (even though Lacan continued to arguesome would say perverselythat he was, in fact, a strict Freudian).Here, then, is your story, as told by Lacan, with the ages provided as very rough approximations since Lacan, like Freud, acknowledged that development varied between individuals and that stages could even exist simultaneously within a given individual 0-6 months of age. In the early stage of development, you were dominated by a pell-mell mix of perceptions, feelings, and needs. You did not distinguish your own self from that of your parents or even the world around you.Rather, you spent your time taking into yourself everything that you startd as pleasurable without any acknowledgment of boundaries. This is the stage, then, when you were closest to the pure materiality of existence, or what Lacan terms the Real. Still, even at this early stage, your body began to be scatte red into specific erogenous zones (mouth, anus, penis, vagina), aided y the fact that your mother tended to pay special attention to these body parts. This territorialization of the body could already be seen as a falling off, an imposition of boundaries and, thus, the neo-natal beginning of socialization (a first step away(predicate) from the Real). Indeed, this fragmentation was accompanied by an identification with those things perceived as fulfilling your lack at this early stage the mothers breast, her voice, her gaze.Since these privileged external objects could not be perfectly assimilated and could not, therefore, ultimately fulfill your lack, you already began to establish the psychic dynamic (fantasy vs. lack) that would control the rest of your life. 6-18 months of age. This stage, which Lacan terms the mirror stage, was a central moment in your development. The mirror stage entails a libidinal dynamism (Ecrits 2) caused by the young childs identification with his own i mage (what Lacan terms the Ideal-I or ideal ego).For Lacan, this act marks the primordial recognition of ones self as I, although at a point before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject (Ecrits 2). In other words, this recognition of the selfs image precedes the entrance into language, after which the subject can understand the place of that image of the self within a bigger social order, in which the subject must negotiate his or her relationship with others.Still, the mirror stage is necessary for the next stage, since to recognize yourself as I is like recognizing yourself as other (yes, that person over there is me) this act is thus fundamentally self-alienating. Indeed, for this reason your feelings towards the image were mixed, caught between hatred (I hate that version of myself because it is so much better than me) and love (I want to be like that image).Note This Ide al-I is important precisely because it represents to the subject a simplified, bounded form of the self, as opposed to the turbulent chaotic perceptions, feelings, and needs felt by the infant. This primordial Discord (Ecrits 4) is particularly formative for the subject, that is, the discord between, on the one hand, the idealizing image in the mirror and, on the other hand, the reality of ones body between 6-18 months (the signs of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the eo-natal months Ecrits 4) The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to foretellingand which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedicand, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subjects undefiled mental development (Ecrits 4).This mis recognition or meconnaissance (seeing an ideal-I where there is a fragmented, chaotic body) subsequently characterizes the ego in all its structures (Ecrits 6). In particular, this creation of an ideal version of the self gives pre-verbal impetus to the creation of narcissistic phantasies in the fully developed subject. It establishes what Lacan terms the imaginary order and, through the imaginary, continues to assert its influence on the subject even after the subject enters the next stage of development. 8 months to 4 years of age. The acquisition of language during this next stage of development further separated you from a connection to the Real (from the actual materiality of things). Lacan builds on such semiotic critics as Ferdinand de Saussure to show how language is a system that makes sense only within its own internal logic of differences the word, father, only makes sense in terms of those other terms it is defined with or against (mother, me, law, the social, etc. . As Kaja Silverman puts it, the signifier father has no relation whatever to the physical fact of any individual father. Instead, that signifier finds its verify in a network of other signifiers, including phallus, law, adequacy, and mother, all of which are equally indifferent to the category of the real (164).Once you entered into the differential system of language, it forever afterwards determined your perception of the world around you, so that the intrusion of the Reals materiality becomes a traumatic event, albeit one that is quite common since our version of reality is built over the chaos of the Real (both the materiality outside you and the chaotic impulses inside you). By acquiring language, you entered into what Lacan terms the symbolic order you were reduced into an empty signifier (I) within the field of the Other, which is to say, within a field of language and culture (which is always determined by those thers that came before you). That linguistic position, according to Lacan, is particularly marked by gender differences, so that all your actions were subsequently determined by your sexual position (which, for Lacan, does not have much to do with your real sexual urges or even your sexual markers but by a linguistic system in which male and female can only be understood in relation to each other in a system of language).The Oedipus complex is just as important for Lacan as it is for Freud, if not more so. The difference is that Lacan maps that complex onto the acquisition of language, which he sees as same. The process of moving through the Oedipus complex (of being made to recognize that we cannot sleep with or even fully have our mother) is our way of recognizing the need to obey social strictures and to follow a closed differential system of language in which we understand self in relation to others. In this linguistic rather than biologic system, the phallus (which must always be understood not to mean penis) comes to stand in the place of everything the subject loses through his entrance into language (a sense of perfect and ultimate meaning or plenitude, which is, of course, impossible) and all the power associated with what Lacan terms the symbolic father and the Name-of-the-Father (laws, control, knowledge).Like the phallus relation to the penis, the Name-of-the-Father is much more than any actual father in fact, it is ultimately more analogous to those social structures that control our lives and that interdict many of our actions (law, religion, medicine, education). Note After one passes through the Oedipus complex, the position of the phallus (a position within that differential system) can be assumed by most anyone (teachers, leaders, even the mother) and, so, to repeat, is not synonymous with either the biological father or the biological penis.Nonetheless, the anatomical differences between boys and girls do lead to a different trajectory for men and women in Lacans system. Men achieve access to the privil eges of the phallus, according to Lacan, by denying their last link to the Real of their own sexuality (their actual penis) for this reason, the castration complex continues to function as a central aspect of the boys psychosexual development for Lacan. In accepting the dictates of the Name-of-the-Father, who is associated with the symbolic phallus, the male subject denies his exual needs and, forever after, understands his relation to others in terms of his position within a larger system of rules, gender differences, and desire. (On Lacans understanding of desire, see the third module. ) Since women do not experience the castration complex in the same way (they do not have an actual penis that must be denied in their access to the symbolic order), Lacan argues that women are not socialized in the same way, that they tolerate more closely tied to what Lacan terms jouissance, the lost plenitude of ones material bodily drives given up by the male subject in order to access the symbo lic power of the phallus.Women are thus at once more lacking (never accessing the phallus as fully) and more full (having not experienced the loss of the penis as fully). Note Regardless, what defines the position of both the man and the women in this schema is above all lack, even if that lack is articulated differently for men and women. (4) In this essay the Writter trys to find binary opposition in the play and apologize who they work in an opposite position. How Krapps last tape is elaborating Deconstruction would be explain at the same time.Lacanian stages in the play is also found and is explained. Notes 1. Abrams, M. H. A Glossary Of Litterary Terms, Thomson LearningUnited tastes of America, 1999, 7th Edition, p. 55-61. 2. Friedman, Marissa L. KRAPPS uttermost TAPE Samuel Beckett Biography. KRAPPS LAST TAPE Samuel Beckett Biography. N. p. , n. d. Web. 8 June 2012.. 3. Felluga, Dino. Modules on Lacan On the Structure of the Psyche. Introductory spotter to Critical Theory . Purdue U. 8 June 2012. . 4. Felluga, Dino. Modules on Lacan On Psychosexual Development. Introductory film to Critical Theory. Purdue U. 8 June 2012. http//www. cla. purdue. edu/ incline/theory/psychoa nalysis/lacandevelop. hypertext mark-up language. 5. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan,https//www. msu. edu/sullivan/BeckettKrapp. html 6. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan,https//www. msu. edu/sullivan/BeckettKrapp. html 7. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan,https//www. msu. edu/sullivan/BeckettKrapp. html 8.Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan,https//www. msu. edu/sullivan/BeckettKrapp. html 9. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan,https//www. msu. edu/sullivan/BeckettKrapp. html 10. Birkett, Jennifer & Kate Ince. Samuel Beckett Criticism and interpretation, Longman Londen, 1999, p. 122. 11. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan, 12. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan, 13. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan,https//www. msu. edu/sullivan/BeckettKrapp. html 14. Wikipedias Editor. The Myth of Sisyphus. 22 May 2012. 12 June 2012, puzzle out Cited Bibliography 1. Abrams, M. H. A Glossary Of Litterary Terms, United tastes of America Thomson Learning, 1999, 7th Edition, p. 55-61. 2. Conner, Steven. Voice and robotic Reproduction Krapps Last Tape, Ohio Impromptu, Rockaby, That Time. Samuel Beckett Criticism and interpretation. Ed. Birkett, Jennifer & Kate Ince, Longman Londen. 1999. 119- 133 3.Howard, Anne. Part IV Contemporary Culture Stain upon the Silence Samuel Becketts Deconstructive Inventions. Drama as Rhetoric/Rhetoric as Drama An geographic expedition of Dramatic and Rhetorical Criticism. Ed. Hart, Steven. , and Stanley Vincent Longman. University of Alabama Press, 1997. THEATRE SYMPOSIUM A PUBLICATION OF THE SOUT HEASTERN THEATRE throng Drama as Rhetoric/Rhetoric as Drama An Exploration of Dramatic and Rhetorical Criticism 4. Weller, Shane. Beckett, Literature, and the Ethics of Alterity. Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 70-180 Website 1. Beckett, Samuel. Krapps Last tape, 7 November 2011, Marl Sullivan, 2. Friedman, Marissa L. KRAPPS LAST TAPE Samuel Beckett Biography. KRAPPS LAST TAPE Samuel Beckett Biography. N. p. , n. d. Web. 8 June 2012. 3. Felluga, Dino. Modules on Lacan On the Structure of the Psyche. Introductory Guide to Critical Theory. Purdue U. 8 June 2012. . 4. Felluga, Dino. Modules on Lacan On Psychosexual Development. Introductory Guide to Critical Theory. Purdue U. 8 June 2012. http//www. cla. purdue. edu/english/theory/psychoa